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THE PERILS OF WRITING AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TORTS 
George C. Christie* 
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY. By G. 
Edward White. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980. Pp. xvi, 
283. $19.95. 
I 
Professor White's book may be approached on a number of dif-
ferent levels. At some levels I found in it much to admire; at other 
levels the book was a great disappointment. 
White's basic theme is how academic and judicial thinking about 
torts has affected the development oftort law. A subsidiary theme is 
the relationship between academics and judges in the evolution of 
tort doctrine. The first two chapters, The Intellectual Origins of Torts 
in America 1 and The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-
1910,2 both previously published separately in law journals, are 
among the book's best portions. They recount how torts developed 
as a discrete legal subject matter and how tort law, particularly the 
ascendance of negligence as the principal basis of liability, was af-
fected by the great conceptualist scholars of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. While I might quibble with some points, 
these chapters testify to White's skills as a historian. 
After laying this groundwork, White proceeds to examine the -
"impact of realism on tort law," and, in succeeding chapters, to dis-
cuss the contributions of Cardozo, Prosser, and Traynor to the devel-
opment of tort law. The final chapter, The 1970's: Neoconceptualism 
and the Future of Tort Law, is divided into two parts. The first is a 
critique of contemporary scholars like Richard Posner and Guido 
Calabresi, who have stressed an economic analysis of tort law, and of 
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University; Fellow, National Humanities 
Center, 1980-1981. A.B. 1955, J.D. 1957, Columbia University; S.J.D. 1966, Harvard Univer-
sity. -Ed. 
I. Taken, with minor changes, from an article with the same name first published in 86 
YALE L.J. 671 (1977). It was subsequently reprinted in G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT 163 (1978). 
2. Taken from an article with the same name first published in 78 COLUM. L. REV. 213 
(1978). 
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scholars like George Fletcher and Richard Epstein, whom White 
categorizes as stressing the importance of corrective justice in tort 
law. In the second part of this chapter, White sets forth some of his 
own views. He feels that tort law should not be viewed primarily as 
a compensation scheme, for there are more efficient means of provid-
ing compensation for injured people. Rather, White believes that 
much of the contemporary significance of tort law must be found in 
its capacity "to sanction or to censure undesirable civil conduct" (pp. 
237-38), what White characterizes as the "admonitory function" (pp. 
237-38). But White does not present any all-encompassing theory of 
tort law. Indeed, he opposes any attempt to establish such theories, 
because he believes that universalizing inevitably distorts the histori-
cal richness of tort law and limits the capacity of the law to respond 
to the complexities of modem life. White also opposes such grand 
conceptualizing because it leads to the "undue prominence" (p. 243) 
of academics as law-makers. He notes that however immunized 
from political accountability judges may be, academics are even less 
politically responsible (pp. 241-43). 
II 
I noted at the outset that White's book may be approached at a 
number of different levels. On the broadest level, I agree with some 
of White's general conclusions: that the law of torts cannot be orga-
nized around a single all-embracing theory; that tort law serves a 
significant admonitory function as evidenced by the importance of 
dignatary torts; and that, ideally, law professors ought not to be law-
makers. But even at this broad level, White states other general con-
clusions that I doubt anyone can evaluate. For example, White 
makes the grand assertion that "[f]ault and tort law became linked at 
a certain time in American history for reasons that had little to do 
with morality" (p. 231 ); White explains the growth of negligence the-
ory as the product of "pressure for some theoretical superstructure 
for tort law" (p. 231) and of "the congeniality of negligence with . . . 
late nineteenth-century preferences for letting losses lie where they 
fell" (p. 231). But I do not see that White's merely noting the possi-
ble existence of such nonmoral factors establishes his assertion that 
the reasons for the rise of negligence had "little to do with morality" 
(p. 231) (emphasis added). I furthermore find it difficult to compre-
hend White's subsequent assertion that "[t]he fact that the theory 
that was developed happened to be negligence was fortuitous" (p. 
231). 
I have already indicated my agreement with White's value judg-
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ment that torts should have an important admonitory function. But 
White makes some much stronger and more questionable claims 
about the distinction between the admonitory and compensatory fea-
tures of tort law. He says, for example, "it was not inevitable that 
tort law should be concerned with compensating victims of civil inju-
ries; compensation has probably not been its original purpose . . ." 
(p. 232). Again he declares, "[t]he emergence of tort law as a com-
pensation system was thus largely fortuitous" (p. 232). Perhaps to 
support these claims, White earlier argues that the nineteenth-cen-
tury acceptance of contributory negligence as a complete defense 
shows that the main thrust of the nineteenth-century action for negli-
gence was admonitory, not compensatory (pp. 164-65).3 If this is the 
basis for White's conclusions, I find his reasoning strained. Obvi-
ously the existence of the central concept of "fault" shows that the 
negligence action has an admonitory function. But, even in the nine-
teenth century, a negligence action had a less admonitory emphasis 
than most actions for intentional torts. An action for negligence did 
not lie for nominal damages, and most plaintiffs in negligence ac-
tions were not seeking to punish the defendant, but rather to get 
compensation for their injuries. I would therefore have placed the 
negligence action among those features of the legal system that were 
primarily designed to secure compensation for victims. Admittedly, 
the defense of contributory negligence prevented the fullest possible 
compensation of accident victims, but this shows only that the notion 
of compensation was not a neutral one. "Compensation" often 
means 'just compensation," and the latter idea encompasses both a 
requirement of fault on the part of the person being asked to provide 
the compensation and, to a lesser extent, a requirement that the vic-
tim seeking compensation must be blameless.4 To note such qualifi-
cations does not establish that the function of a negligence action 
was ever primarily admonitory. 
III 
If, when approached at the most general levels, White's book 
contains some theses that seem correct and others that seem ques-
tionable and certainly hard to document, the same sort of restrained 
3. See also p. 62. 
4. As will be seen, White accepts that the thrust of strict liability for defective products is 
compensatory. P. 172. And yet, with the advent of comparative negligence, an increasing 
number of courts are making contributory negligence a partial defense to an action for prod-
ucts liability brought on a strict liability theory. See notes 47-50 iefra. Thus, the presence of 
the contributory negligence defense seems an unreliable indicator of admonitory policies. 
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and mildly favorable reaction cannot be maintained by the critic 
who examines White's execution at a more particular level: his han-
dling of the nuts and bolts of legal research in his summary of the 
development of tort law in the twentieth century. Although many of 
White's errors are admittedly relatively trivial, they are not simply 
typographical or proof-reading errors (of which the book also has its 
fair share).5 
To start at a fairly trivial level: White attempts to give his book 
an aura of thoroughness and verisimilitude, which might appeal to 
nonlawyer readers, by his inclusion of much legally extraneous de-
tail. For instance, he often provides the full names of the parties in 
the cases he discusses; he also gives the exact size of the bean-weigh-
ing error (11,854 pounds) in Glanzer v. Shephard (p. 132).6 This is a 
harmless annoyance when the details are correct; when they are 
wrong, however, they are infuriating. White twice asserts that the 
river into which the decedent in Hynes v. New York Central Rail-
road7 dove was the "Hudson River" (p. 121 ). It was the Harlem 
River. 8 The discussion of the Hynes case occurs in a chapter devoted 
to Benjamin Cardozo's work on the New York Court of Appeals. 
White puts the reader immediately on guard when he begins by as-
serting that Cardozo "served as associate justice and then chief jus-
tice of the New York Court of Appeals" (p. 115). I should have 
thought that White would have known that Cardozo was Associate 
Judge and later Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. 
And, in the chapter on Justice Traynor, the case of Richards v. Stan-
ley9 is said to involve "a statute making it a misdemeanor to leave 
keys in a car parked on a public street" (p. 193). "Confronted," as 
White writes, with both this statute and with cases in other jurisdic-
tions holding that car owners owed a duty to injured third persons in 
such situations, "[n]onetheless [Traynor] found that Mrs. Stanley 
was not liable to Richards. Traynor disposed of the statute by noting 
that it was not intended to have any bearing on civil actions ... " 
(pp. 193-94). In point of fact, the case involved a municipal ordi-
5. One confusing instance appears in chapter 3. White several times refers to Roscoe 
Pound's article, Mechanical Jurisprudence. Pp. 71, 260 nn. 14, 22, 24-27. The reference in the 
notes is to some variant of "supra, note 10." There is no reference to the Pound Article in note 
10, nor as nearly as I can tell is the full citation of the article contained anywhere in the book. 
The Pound article, of course, appeared in 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). 
6. 233 N.Y. 236,238, 135 N.E. 275,275 (1922). In his discussion of the case, White has the 
buyer hiring the public weigher, whereas in fact the seller did so. 
7. 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1921). 
8. 231 N.Y. at 231, 131 N.E. at 898. 
9. 43 Cal 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954). 
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nance (not, as White writes, a state statute). Furthermore, any impli-
cation here that Traynor engaged in any judicial creativity is 
unwarranted when we consider that the ordinance expressly forbade 
the introduction into evidence in any civil trial of the ordinance itself 
or any violations of it. 10 Thus, White is perhaps inadvertently mis-
leading when he writes that Traynor "disposed of the statute" (p. 
194); in fact Traynor was merely following its very terms. 
One reason that White may have brought out the pedant in me is 
that, presumably for the illumination of lay readers ( or to impress 
them with his arcane erudition), White has the following to say 
about the holding/ dictum distinction: 
Judges, for example, had an obligation to give reasons supporting the 
results they reached, but their reasons functioned on different levels. 
Some reasons justified the narrow holding; other reasons generalized 
the results in a limited fashion (dicta); still others were added as emo-
tional weight and their generalized significance was uncertain ( obiter 
dicta) .... [P. 144.] 11 
This distinction between dictum and obiter dictum is not, I submit, 
one that is generally accepted by lawyers. 12 I certainly was not fa-
miliar with it. Neither Black's Law Dictionary nor Jowett's Diction-
ary of English Law recognizes any such distinction. Indeed, both 
Black's Law Dictionary 13 and Jowett's Dictionary ef English Law 14 
expressly state that dictum is an abbreviation for obiter dictum. 
Other instances of White's mishandling of the nuts and bolts of 
legal research are of more substantive import. For example, White 
describes Prosser's role in achieving recognition of the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional suffering. He notes that Prosser "had 
collected 'mental disturbance' cases in a 1939 article, announced the 
birth of a 'new tort,' and proposed an 'extreme and outrageous' stan-
dard of liability. By 1948 the 'extreme and outrageous' standard had 
been adopted by the Restatement of Torts ... " (p. 161). White cites 
for support section 46 of the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement .15 
In point of fact the wording "extreme and outrageous" did not ap-
IO. 43 Cal. 2d at 61-62, 271 P.2d at 24. 
11. The context in which the discussion of the holding/dictum distinction appears is in the 
review of "scholarly efforts from the 1940s through the 1960s, " which White sees "as attempts 
to integrate generality and particularity in law through a precise analysis of the level at which 
a given decision was intending to communicate." Pp. 143-44. "Such an analysis,'' according 
to White, "required a sophisticated awareness of the nature of rationality in law .... " P. 144 
(emphasis supplied). 
12. The only reference in print to the distinction that could be found after appreciable 
effort appears in w. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 85 (1980). 
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 409 (5th ed. 1979). 
14. THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 628 (gen. ed. The Earl Jowett 1959). 
15. P. 161 n.69; footnote appears at p. 271. 
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pear in section 46 until 1964, with the appearance of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. 16 In 1948, section 46 was drafted in terms of the 
liability of one who "intentionally causes severe emotional distress to 
another." 17 This was a considerably broader standard of liability 
that, if it had been retained, might have been challenged as an in-
fringement of constitutionally protected freedom of speech. Further-
more, the sources which White appears to cite for the statement that 
Prosser proposed the "extreme and outrageous standard" before 
1948 provide no support. I say "appears to cite," because one of the 
footnote references is to Palsgraf Revisited, an article that has noth-
ing to do with the subject and moreover did not appear until 1953, 
well after the 1948 revision of the Restatement. 18 White is appar-
ently referring to the article Prosser wrote in 1939, which White cites, 
and to the 1941 first edition of Prosser's treatise19 in which Prosser 
repeated the arguments of his 1939 article. Neither in the source 
cited nor in any source seemingly cited does the phrase "extreme and 
outrageous," as nearly as I can tell, appear. The closest approach to 
that phraseology in Prosser's work before 1948 is "the intentional 
infliction of extreme mental suffering by outrageous conduct," in the 
1939 article, at a page not specifically cited by White, seemingly or 
othenyise.20 Prosser did not use the precise phrase "extreme and 
outrageous conduct" until 1964, in the third edition of his treatise.21 
Discussing Prosser's contributions to the doctrine of last clear 
chance, White writes that Prosser, 
16. l RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 {1964). 
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 46 (Supp. 1948). 
18. The sentence in the text is: "In his treatment of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, for example, Prosser stated that 'somewhere around 1930 it began to be recognized 
that the intentional infliction of mental disturbance by extreme and outrageous conduct consti-
tuted a cause of action in itself.'" P. 161. White's footnote 67, p. 271, is "Ibid. at 56.'' Note 66 
is also "/hid.'' Note 65 is "Prosser, 'Palsgraf Revisited,' supra note 52, at 32.'' In point of fact, 
the statement quoted is from w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (4th ed. 
1971). The statement does not appear in the 1941 edition of Prosser's treatise, which is the 
only one relevant to White's discussion. 
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 54-67 (1941). 
20. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 31 MICH. L. Rev. 874, 
892 (1939). Other phrases used are "intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering in an 
extreme form" (id. at 874); "outrageous conduct, of a kind especially calculated to cause seri-
ous mental and emotional disturbance" (id. at 879); "oppressive and outrageous conduct ••. 
under circumstances peculiarly calculated to cause mental distress" (id. at 881); "outrageous 
insults" (id. at 882); "outrageously insulting collection letters or verbal abuse" (id. at 885); and 
"(w]ith the exception of a recent Texas case ... no case ... has been found where the de-
fendant's conduct was anything but flagrant and outrageous" (id. at 888). In the 1941 version 
of Prosser's treatise, supra note 19, as nearly as I can tell, the phrases are "acts of an especially 
flagrant character'' (id. at 54); "outrageous insults" (id. at 59-60); and "conduct exceeding all 
bounds usually tolerated by society" (id. at 65). 
21. W. PROSSER, TORTS 49 {3d ed. 1964). 
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[h]aving exposed the fictional, inconsistent, and arbitrary nature oflast 
clear chance ... announced that, after all, the "situations" in which 
last clear chance tended to arise "may be classified." His classification 
distinguished between three types of "last clear chance" cases: "help-
less plaintiff" cases, "inattentive plaintiff" cases, and cases where the 
defendant's "antecedent negligence" prevented him from avoiding in-
jury to the plaintiff even though he had exercised the "last clear 
chance" to prevent the accident. [P. 159.] 
White implies here that this tripartite classification originated with 
Prosser. But such is not the case. In fact the classification is the 
same one adopted _in 1934 by the Restatement of Torts, seven years 
before the publication of the first edition of Prosser's treatise.22 Pros-
ser himself never made the claim that White does for the originality 
of his analysis. 
This dreary review of what is, to say the least, an unlawyerlike 
treatment of sources, continues. White, again in describing Prosser's 
work, synopsizes the "landmark" case of Goldberg v. Kollsman In-
strument Corp., 23 as "allowing a beneficiary of a person killed in an 
airplane crash to proceed against the manufacturer of the defective 
altimeter that caused the accident ... " (p. 170).24 This statement 
seems to be asserting that the Goldberg case allowed an action, in 
strict products liability, against the maker of a component part. In 
point of fact the case did no such thing. Rather, the New York 
Court of Appeals specifically held that an action in strict liability lay 
only against the manufacturer of the finished product, in this case 
the airplane manufacturer. 25 
The cumulative effect of all these errors is to make one extremely 
skeptical about those of White's more general legal assertions that 
22. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 479-80 (1934). Section 479 deals with helpless plaintiffs 
and § 480 with inattentive ones. Both sections limit liability to negligence in the failure to 
utilize with reasonable care the defendant's "then existing ability to avoid harming the plain-
tiff." Id. §§ 479(c), 480(c). See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 408-16 
(1941). 
23. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). 
24. White identifies two_pther "landmarks" in the extension of strict liability: Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,377 P.2d 897 (1963); Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). P. 170. 
25. 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595. White's egregious error is all 
the more remarkable since it occurs in connection with his discussion of Prosser, The Fall of the 
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). Prosser specifically 
noted what he considered the Goldberg case's odd conclusion in that article. Id. at 841 & 
n.124. In discussing another products liability case, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 
2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), White discusses the case as if the asserted negligence of the bottler 
was its failure to check the adequacy of new bottles already tested by the glass manufacturer. 
P. 198. In point of fact, the majority in Esco/a was focusing on the fact that the bottler reused 
bottles-a point White does not mention. The majority was prepared to assert that, if ade-
quate tests of used bottles could not be devised, they should not be reused. 24 Cal. 2d at 460-
61, 150 P.2d at 440. 
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are either unsupported or only insufficiently supported by citations. 
An instance of the latter occurs in White's extended discussion of 
Cardozo's opinion in McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls.26 White 
treats the opinion as a landmark which reoriented the law of nui-
sance (pp. 127-29). In McFarlane, Cardozo held that a woman who 
brought an action for injuries sustained from falling on an improp-
erly constructed sidewalk could be barred by contributory negli-
gence even if the action were brought in nuisance, so long as the 
alleged nuisance resulted from defendant's negligent conduct. Ac-
cording to White, "[t]raditionally in New York the commission of a 
nuisance, whether public or private, had been treated as an 'act-at-
peril' tort: the person committing the nuisance was liable to others 
even if he had taken all available precautions and even if the in-
jured person should have foreseen the risks of injury" (p. 128).27 
Later in his discussion, however, White betrays doubt about such an 
unequivocal interpretation of the pre-McFarlane case law: "[e]arlier 
cases had intimated that contributory negligence might not be a de-
fense to an action based on nuisance" (p. 128).28 Of the four cases 
cited by White in the course of his discussion, one involved the in-
tentional burning of soft coal29 and quoted earlier authority that an 
injunction could be granted even if the defendant's operations pre-
ceded the plaintiff's purchase of his house,30 although in the instant 
case the plaintiff had purchased his property several years before the 
defendant erected its factory.31 Another of the cases cited by White 
involved a plaintiff-night watchman who was bitten by the defen-
dant-employer's "ferocious dog"32 "of immense size, and a brute as 
savage as a tiger or a lion"33 that was allowed to run loose on the 
defendant's factory grounds.34 The two remaining cases that White 
cites did involve actions for injuries caused by improperly con-
26. 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928). 
27. (Footnotes omitted) (citing McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 
N.E. 549 (1907); Muller v. McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195 (1878)). 
28. (Emphasis added) (citing Clifford v. Dam, 81 N.Y. 53 [sic] (1880); McGuire v. Spence, 
91 N.Y. 302 [sic] (1883)). The proper page citation for Clifford is 52; that for McGuire 303. 
29. McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907), cited by 
White. P. 267 n.31. 
30. 189 N.Y. at 47, 81 N.E. at 550. 
31. 189 N.Y. at 45, 81 N.E. at 550. 
32. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195, 198 (1878), cited by White. P. 267 n. 32. 
33. 73 N.Y. at 205. 
34. Since Muller invoked the traditional strict liability of the owners of dangerous animals, 
it seems inconclusive on the point pursued by White. 
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structed sidewalks35 but at least one of these cases suggests that con-
tributory negligence might be a defense in some such cases. 36 Thus 
the cited cases simply do not support the conclusion that Cardozo, in 
McFar/ane, made any remarkably creative use of precedent. I dwell 
upon the matter because White contends that "Cardozo made the 
result in McFarlane seem so inexorable and sensible that one might 
overlook the fact that his opinion sought virtually to eliminate nui-
sance as a separate category of tort actions" (p. 128). It seems un-
likely that Cardozo sought to do any such thing. It is at least as 
plausible that the existing precedents seemed so clear to him that he 
did not think that he was making a major change in the law.37 
I have even more difficulty with White's theorizing about Car-
dozo's opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.38 According to 
White, 
[t]he pronouncement was that while the negligent misrepresentations 
of accountants did not subject them to liability to third persons in neg-
ligence, those misrepresentations if "gross" enough could subject them 
to liability to third persons in fraud. This last pronouncement was not 
only unsupported but represented a departure from prior case law, 
which had limited liability for unintentional or reckless misrepresenta-
tions to persons who were parties to the original transaction. [P. 135.] 
No citations are given to this "prior case law." Given White's casual 
treatment of authority, one is hesitant to accept the statement on 
faith. In fact, in .Derry v. Peek,39 decided more than forty years 
before Ultramares, the House of Lords had indicated that a fraud 
35. McGuire v. Spence, 91 N.Y. 303 (1883); Clifford v. Dam, 81 N.Y. 52 (1880), cited by 
White. P. 267 n.33. 
36. The McGuire case most strongly indicates the availability of the defense. In Cl!fford 
the court suggested that if the sidewalk had been constructed under the authority of a permit, 
the defense might lie. Prosser cites the Cl!lford case as standing for the proposition that courts 
have ruled that contributory negligence is not a defense to an action based on nuisance. W. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 609 & n.23 (4th ed. 1971). But this statement, if 
true, was only strictly true under the Cl!fford case of sidewalks constructed without an author-
izing permit. Thus in McFarlane, counsel for the defendant City of Niagara Falls seems to 
have correctly understood the thrust of Cl!fford when he argued that the sidewalk in question 
"was authorized ... [the City] did not construct it without or against statutory authority." 
McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 341 (1928). 
37. One might note that it seems to be accepted as commonplace in English law that con-
tributory negligence has long been a defense to an action based upon nuisance, particularly in 
highway obstruction cases. See Dymond v. Pearce, (1972] l Q.B. 496 (C.A.); cf. Farrell v. 
John Mowlem & Co., [1954] l Lloyd's List L.R. 437. There are no cases questioning that 
assumption. It also has been pointed out that "Bulle,jieldv.Forrester, (1809) 11 East 60, seems 
to have been a case of nuisance although always regarded as a leading case on contributory 
negligence." J. SALMOND, TORTS 59 n. 93 (17th ed. R. Heuston 1977). This statement is made 
in connection with the statement in the text that one can assume that contributory negligence is 
a defense in all cases of nuisance. 
38. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). 
39. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). 
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action could be brought against persons not in privity with the in-
jured party on grounds of recklessness as to truth or falsity.40 
The unease created by White's sloppiness leads one to question 
statements like this: "[t]he railroad" in Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail-
road "had liability insurance . . ." (p. 99). How does White know 
this? White gives no citation to the record, and the record of the case 
in fact contains no such information.41 My own experience in prac-
tice was that, at least as recently as the late 1950s, most railroads 
were self-insured. 
To end this portion of my review on a more substantive note, I 
wish to tum to White's treatment of the development of strict liabil-
ity in tort for defective products. White discusses the practical sig-
nificance of the introduction of strict liability for defective products. 
White does not see this significance as lying in strict liability's crea-
tion of a "vast new class of litigants in defective products cases" (pp. 
170-71), since even under a negligence theory MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co. 42 and cases following it "had extended the duty of manu-
facturers to remote persons injured in a foreseeable fashion" (pp. 
170-71). "Nor," owing to the liberal use of res ipsa loquitur in negli-
gence cases, "did strict liability help plaintiffs surmount problems of 
proof' (p. 171 ). Rather, the major innovation over the negligence 
system wrought by strict liability was strict liability's permitting the 
plaintiff more readily "to identify the defendant responsible for his 
injuries" (p. 171). The importance of the shift to a strict liability, in 
other words, was that the plaintiff consumers could no longer be de-
feated by the complexities of the distribution system, since they 
"could identify manufacturers as prospective defendants" (p. 171 ). 
Perhaps it is merely a case of my own obtuseness,43 but it is not easy 
to see how strict liability helps solve the problem of identification in 
40. 14 App. Cas. at 361, 364-64. See also 14 App. Cas. at 379, where Lord Herschell stated, 
"I cannot hold it proved ..• that [the defendant) knowingly made a false statement, or one 
which he did not believe to be true, or was careless whether what he stated was true or false" 
(emphasis added). It should be noted that, contrary to the implications of White, Cardozo did 
not hold in Ultramares that "gross negligence" was the equivalent of fraud but rather, relying 
on lJerry v. Peek, that gross negligence could be evidence of fraud. In Ult ram ares the defend• 
ants' fraud was their certification of something as true as a result of their own investigation-
the correspondence of the balance sheet to their client's accounts - when, as a jury could find, 
the defendants did not know if there was any such correspondence. In other words they stated 
that something was true without having "a sure or genuine belief on the subject." See Ul-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189-93, 174 N.E. 441, 446-50 (1931), 
41. For the record of the Palsgref case, see A. Scorr & R. KENT, CASES AND OTHER 
MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 1061-105 (1967) (reprinting the complete "Case on Appeal" 
filed in printed form with the court of appeals). 
42. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
43. White may mean to say that strict liability simply created a new cause of action against 
manufacturers. If so, his difficulties are verbal and not doctrinal. 
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an action against the manufacturer or against any person prior to the 
retailer in the distribution scheme. Under section 402A of the Re~ 
statement (Second) ofTorts,44 the paradigmatic standard of strict lia-
bility for defective products, the plaintiff must show that the product 
was defective at the time of sale by the particular defendant.45 In a 
negligence case, the plaintiff must show that the negligence occurred 
before the manufacturer first sold the item. One would have liked to 
see more argument as to why the negligence and strict liability sys-
tems present such markedly different problems of identification. 
I also cannot fail to fault White for neglecting to discuss or even 
mention the effect of the development of comparative negligence on 
products liability. White does of course discuss the rise of compara-
tive negligence and the decline of contributory negligence as a com-
plete -defense to a negligence action (pp. 164-68). Under the 
doctrines of strict liability for defective products as developed by 
Prosser and Traynor (whose contributions White discusses at some 
length (pp. 168-72, 197-207)), one of the advantages to the plaintiff of 
a strict products liability action over a negligence action is that con-
tributory negligence is not a defense.46 The development of strict 
liability for defective products is clearly one of the important fea-
tures of what White sees as changing the thrust of tort law from ad-
monition to compensation (p. 172). In a book published in 1980 I 
would have liked to see White's reaction to the fact that California, 
since 1978,47 Florida, since 1976,48 Texas, since 1977,49 and now an 
44. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer 
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) ar.plies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all poss16le care in tlie preparation and sale of his product, 
and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965): 
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the 
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which will be 
unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a 
safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it 
is consumed. . • . 
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). 
47. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d I 162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 
(1978). 
48. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). 
49. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). 
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increasing number of other jurisdictions50 have held that contribu-
tory negligence in the form of comparative negligence, is a defense to 
an action based upon strict liability for defective products. 
IV 
I should now like to tum to what I consider a major conceptual 
defect in White's attempt to write an intellectual history of the law of 
torts. 
White spends a great deal of time discussing the influence of cer-
tain "legal realists," especially the late Leon Green, who contended 
that there are no generalized duties owed by all to all, but only duties 
owed by some particular persons to other particular persons (pp. 82-
83, 94-96, 107-08, 125-27). According to Green, the crucial issues in 
the trial of an action for negligence are the issues of duty and breach 
of duty. The issue of causation, by contrast, concerns only the lim-
ited initial question of whether a "causal connection" existed be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. On the 
issues of duty and breach of duty, it is for the judge to decide as a 
matter of public policy whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty. Foreseeability of harm or risk is an important component of 
this inquiry, but it is not the only one. If the judge finds the exist-
ence of a duty and if there is a causal relation between the defen-
dant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm, the jury must then make the 
crucial decision whether the particular defendant has been negligent 
to the particular plaintiff. The jury in deciding the negligence issue 
will consider many of the factors already considered by the judge in 
determining the existence of a duty, but it will consider them only in 
relation to the parties to the litigation, and not as a matter of broad 
social policy. It is the jury's function to find whether "under all the 
circumstances (including this multitude of cause factors) the defend-
ant's conduct was negligent and whether he should be penalized for 
his conduct or whether plaintiff should have to bear his loss without 
compensation."51 White maintains, undoubtedly correctly, that 
50. See Steuve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978); Kennedy 
v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1980); Busch v. Busch Constr. Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 
(Minn. 1977). See also N.Y. C1v. PRAc. § 1411 (McKinney 1976), enacted in 1975, which 
provides for comparative negligence in "any action ..• for personal injury, injury to property, 
or wrongful death" (emphasis added). 
51. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 571-72 
(1962) (emphasis in original). See Green, The JJuty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1014 (1928); Green, The JJuty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 CoLUM. L. REV. 
255 (1929); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961). Green 
had earlier sketched out his ideas, in textbook form, in L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE 
CAUSE (1927). 
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Green's views strongly influenced Cardozo in the Palsgraf case (pp. 
96-100). Since Palsgraf, according to White, many of the crucial is-
sues of negligence theory have been removed from the jury's proxi-
mate cause inquiry and subsumed under the court's decision of the 
duty issue (p. 184). The result, White says, is that the relational no-
tion of negligence, the notion that duties are owed to particular per-
sons and not to the world at large, has become paramount. 52 White 
furthermore, as already noted, sees a decline in the importance of 
negligence as the ambit of strict liability expands and law becomes 
more and more a compensation system. 
To some of these conclusions I must respectfully dissent. It is of 
course true that the scope of strict liability has expanded. But so has 
the reach of negligence. As White himself recognizes, areas such as 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and injuries caused by own-
ers and occupiers of land are ceasing to have their own special doc-
trines and are being absorbed by general negligence theory. 53 Such a 
development is surely not the result of any multiplication of particu-
larized duties; on the contrary, I would assert that the past thirty 
years have witnessed the emergence of a single general duty: one 
normally has a duty to avoid injuring all those whom one has sub-
jected to a foreseeable risk of (physical) injury. If the foreseeability 
of injury is slight then the reasonableness of one's conduct may be-
come important. Far from relegating proximate cause to the ash 
heap of history, this general duty, since it focuses on the foreseeabil-
ity of injury, makes the considerations underlying proximate cause 
dispositive in hard tort cases. If tort duties were completely particu-
larized, depending on the unique features of particular plaintiffs in 
relation to particular defendants, all torts law would be ex post facto. 
It would have no predictive features. Leon Green declared that he 
accepted the complete ex post facto character of negligence, 54 but 
even he accepted limited generalizations about classes of cases. For 
example, he generalized about "railroad cases"55 even though such 
52. See pp. 107, 184. 
53. White discusses the extension of general negligence theory to the liability of landown-
ers at pp. 190-93. The extension of general negligence theory to the negligent infliction of 
mental distress is generally taken as having received tremendous ~petus from Dillon v. Legg, 
68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). More recent cases include Dziokonski v. 
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Portee v. Jaffee-, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). 
54. See Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 257, 269 (1960). See 
also Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1025 (1928). 
55. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 CoLUM. L. REV. 255, 275 
(1929). In the same article he also discussed, inter alia, automobile cases, id. at 277. See also 
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 42 (1962), where, inter alia, 
Green grouped "car key cases," id. at 63, and ''bad brakes-darting out cases," id. at 68. 
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generalization was contrary to his theory of the particularity of each 
case. Some railroads are more solvent than others and some are 
more essential for the communities they serve than others; general-
izations like "railroad cases" smooth over differences that Green, 
had he been perfectly consistent, would have treated as important. 
At any rate, most observers have resiled from the implications of 
Green's theories, and I would submit that the recent history of negli-
gence shows a move toward a more generalized theory of negligence. 
Why has tort law moved away from the complete instantiation of 
each case? First, administrative difficulties make it impossible to try 
all cases and so we must adopt rules that encourage pre-trial settle-
ment of disputes. Without general criteria of liability to serve as the 
basis for settlement, parties would rarely settle. Secondly, I would 
maintain, public notions of justice also require a level of generality 
that would be impossible if each discrete feature of a case became a 
factor to be weighed on the scales of justice. 
I would assert, however, that the main reason for the collapse of 
the particularized justice theory of negligence is its failure to provide 
any adequate decision-making procedure. Of course, in one sense, 
all decision making involves a balancing of interests. But to main-
tain that interest balancing is properly the essence of most or perhaps 
all individual judicial decisions is another matter. White seems to 
approve of the realists' and post-realists' insistence that the decision 
of each tort case should tum on the balancing of the interests in-
volved in that case.56 Although White does present some more gen-
eral reflections on the intellectual battles between legal realism and 
its opponents, 57 a quotation from Prosser - " 'most of the writers 
who have pointed out the process have stopped short of telling us 
how it is to be done' "58 - is about the extent of White's recognition 
of the formidable practical and epistemological shortcomings of the 
interest-balancing theory. I therefore fault White for writing an in-
tellectual history, which is not only descriptive but also critical, in 
which he does not examine the difficulties of a theory that plays such 
a prominent part in his discussion; this criticism is valid regardless of 
56. My conclusion that White "seems to approve" the thrust of realistic thought as to inter-
est balancing is based upon the general tone of his writing and specific statements such as this: 
''The ambivalence of the Palsgraf case came from the failure of either Cardozo's or Andrew's 
opinions openly to concede that in cases involving liability in negligence for remote conse-
quences, or to remote persons, the process of resolution was explicitly one of interest-balanc-
ing." P. 100. His approval of post-realist interest balancing is suggested by his comments 
upon Presser's continuation of that approach in the world of torts scholarship. See pp. 157-58. 
51. See, e.g., pp. 74-75, 110-13, 139-43. 
58. P. 158 (quoting w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 17 (1941)). 
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whether White himself approves of the i?-teres!-balancing approach. 
I shall proceed to sketch briefly some of the difficulties of the inter-
est-balancing theory. 
An adequate theory of interests must initially confront the prob-
lem of defining and identifying "interests." Since White often cites 
Karl Llewellyn when he wants to describe the tenets of legal real-
ism, 59 we might examine what Llewellyn, in his heyday as a realist, 
thought interests were. According to Llewellyn, the "interests" ban-
died about in common speech were not true interests, but only apho-
risms. Expressions like "security of transactions" were merely 
rubrics, or, to use the phrase Llewellyn adopted, "a red flag to chal-
lenge investigation in certain general directions."60 Interests, he said, 
were rather "groupings of behavior claimed to be significant."61 
When talking about interests it was important to examine "the objec-
tive data, the spec!fic data, claimed to represent an interest."62 
"What is left, in the realm of description are at the one end the facts, 
the groupings of conduct (and demonslrable expectations) which 
may be claimed to constitute an interest; and on the other the prac-
tices of courts in their effects upon the conduct and expectations of 
the laymen in question."63 As thus defined, interests are complex 
entities that are difficult to summarize in a few words and to identify 
in individual cases. 
Next, even if one could come up with relatively concise and yet 
meaningful statements of the interests involved in a particular case, 
one would face the further problem of deciding whether the interests 
identified were really comparable enough to permit balancing them 
against each other. Roscoe Pound long ago pointed out that one 
cannot directly weigh social or public interests against individual in-
terests.64 That would be like comparing apples and oranges. To 
weigh individual interests against social interests, the individual in-
terests in, say, security of the person, would have to be translated 
into the social interest in the security of the individual. 65 
59. See, e.g., pp. 71 n.21, 112 n.162, 140 n.5. 
60. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 445 
(1930) (emphasis in original). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 446. 
63. Id. at 448. 
64. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1-3 (1943). This article was a 
revised version of a paper presented to the American Sociological Association in 1921. Id. at 1 
n.*. 
65. Id. at 3. The point was well restated, although unfortunately without reference to 
Pound's contributions, in Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme 
Court's Balancing Test, 16 HARV. L. REV. 755, 763 (1963). 
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Even assuming that all the necessary translations could be made 
so that all the interests being considered were in the same universe of 
discourse, the ultimate problem would remain: how do you weight 
the interests? One may recall Ronald Dworkin's suggestion that the 
reason that judges do not have broad discretion, even in cases not 
covered by legal rules, is that there exist certain legal principles that 
constrain judicial choices. 66 Dworkin recognized, however, that for 
his analysis to be plausible there would have to be a way to weight 
these principles so that, when the principles came into conflict, as 
they almost always would in difficult cases, the proper decision could 
be reached.67 Dworkin may have intended to develop such a weight-
ing procedure, but it is clear that he now regards the task as impossi-
ble. While continuing to maintain that right answers exist, he now 
believes that the right answer is the one that the judge finds in accord 
with a coherent set of principles that 'Justifies . . . in the way that 
fairness requires" the decision in the instant case in light of the "in-
stitutional history'' of society's legal structure.68 I do not propose to 
examine the intricacies of Dworkin's claim here. My purpose is 
merely to underscore the difficulties of achieving a coherent scheme 
for weighting legal principles. 
In sum, the problems of identifying, comparing and weighting 
interests would present courts with a mind-boggling task. A tort sys-
tem wholly given over to the theory of particularized justice would 
be nothing more than Judge Hutchinson's "hunch" system: judges 
would be forced to decide by their gut feelings after looking at the 
whole Gestalt. 69 We may let juries decide by hunch, but we place 
strict controls on their power to do so, and even stricter controls on 
judges. A judge must justify his decision. Of course the law does not 
contain precise rules that dictate the result of each case. But when a 
judge decides in favor of, say, the defendant, he must explain why 
the case is different from the cases relied upon by the plaintiff in 
which the plaintiff prevailed, and the differences that the judge 
66. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967), in which he elabo-
rated on the thesis previously announced in his Judicial .Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963). The 
Model of Rules is among the essays reprinted in R. DWORKIN, TAK.ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at 
14 (1977), as The Model of Rules I. For the criticism that the illustrations that Dworkin used to 
support his thesis simply do not support his argument, see Christie, The Model of Principles, 
1968 DUKE LJ. 649. 
67. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 66, at 25-27, 35-36 (TAKING RIGHTS SERI• 
OUSLY, supra note 66, at 24-27, 34-37). 
68. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. Rev. 1057, 1098-99 (1975), reprinted in TAK• 
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 66, at 81, 120. 
69. See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial .Deci-
sion, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). 
March 1981] Tort Law in America 963 
points out must be legally significant ones.70 Under a system of par-
ticularized justice, such explanations would be all but impossible. 
Interest balancing without the constraints of the traditional legal re-
quirement of consistency within general categories of cases would 
turn out in practice to be nothing more than well-intentioned bias 
masquerading as objective justice. 
An example from the Restatement illustrates the difficulty with 
making interest balancing the keystone of judicial decision making 
in torts. In 1938, section 520 of the Restatement of Torts subjected 
the operator of an "ultrahazardous activity" to strict liability if the 
activity miscarried, and defined such an activity as one that (a) "nec-
essarily involves a risk of serious harm" to others and (b) "is not a 
matter of common usage."71 The common-usage exception was in-
tended to accommodate Lord Cairns's declaration in Rylands v. 
F!etcher72 that the liability established in that case was limited to the 
"non-natural use" of land. One practical implication of the com-
mon-usage exception was that automobile driving would not be 
classed as an ''ultrahazardous activity." Other applications of the 
common-usage exception posed some difficulties. What about fumi-
gation of commercial buildings? It certainly was a common enough 
activity; indeed in many cities it was required by law. Nevertheless, 
in Luthringer v. Moore, 73 the Supreme Court of California, citing for 
support the Comments to section 520, 74 held that, while fumigation 
might be a common activity, it was only performed by a very small 
number of professional fumigators. It was thus not a matter of com-
mon usage and, accordingly, could appropriately be classified as an 
ultrahazardous activity subject to strict liability. In contrast, how-
ever, in Loe v. Lenhardt, 75 the Oregon Supreme Court classed crop-
dusting as an ultrahazardous activity despite the fact that the court 
considered it a matter of common usage. The dangerousness of the 
activity alone was sufficient to justify this classification. 
In 1977, Volume III of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was 
published. Although Prosser was by then dead, he had been the Re-
porter when section 520 and its companion sections were drafted. 76 
Instead of "ultrahazardous activity," the Restatement (Second) used 
10. See Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311, 1333 (1969). 
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938). 
72. L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 339 (1868). 
73. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d I (1948). 
74. 31 Cal. 2d at 500, 190 P.2d at 8 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 520, Comment e). 
75. 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961). 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). 
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the term "abnormally dangerous activity." But more to the point, 
the Restatement (Second) openly adopted, instead of the two-
pronged test of the Restatement, a factor analysis that included inter-
est-balancing. The full text of section 520 of the Second Restatement 
merits quotation: 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the fol-
lowing factors are to be considered: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, 
land or chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried 
on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes.77 
This statement of the test leaves two overriding questions. Who is to 
make the determination of what is an abnormally dangerous activity, 
and how is the required factor analysis and interest-balancing to be 
done? As to the first question, the Second Restatement's Comments 
declare that the judge and not the jury is to decide whether an activ-
ity is an abnormally dangerous one.78 The Comments concede that 
in a negligence case a jury might have to make a whole host of sub-
jective determinations in deciding the reasonableness of an activity, 
but the Comments conclude that the decision whether an activity is 
abnormally dangerous is of a different type. The principal difference 
asserted is that, unlike a jury's decision in a negligence case, the clas-
sifi.cation of an activity as abnormally dangerous could destroy an 
entire industry. But of course a ruling that a product, say an airliner, 
is negligently designed could also destroy an industrial enterprise. 
Moreover, at least in California79 and probably in New Jersey,80 in 
actions brought on a theory of strict liability for defective products, 
the issue of product defect is submitted to the jury. Why should 
strict liability under an abnormally dangerous activity theory be 
treated differently from strict liability for a defective product? 
The second question raised by section 520 of the Restatement 
(Second), and the one that most immediately concerns this discus-
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 520 (1977). This volume of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) was adopted in 1976 and published in 1977. 
78. Id. at Comment l. 
19. See Barker v. Lull Engr. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-40, 573 P.2d 
443, 457-58 (1978); 50 CAL. JuR. 3d, Products Liability, § 41 (1979). 
80. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 176-77, 406 A.2d 140, 153 
(1979). 
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sion, is how the six factors listed are to be weighted. The Comments 
declare that the determination is to be made by the court, "upon 
consideration of all the factors listed in this Section, and weight 
given to each that it merits upon the facts in evidence."81 I submit 
that this is no weighting method. If taken literally the Comments 
seem to suggest that each case is sui generis and that one need have 
no fear that an individual decision, whether made by a judge or a 
jury, might ruin an entire industry. Thus in any case involving an 
activity not covered foursquare by a precedent, one would have to 
litigate up to the highest court of the jurisdiction before knowing 
how the activity would be classified. The value of precedents cover-
ing other activities would be minimal. Whether one liked the old 
test or not, it was certainly easier to administer, since it asked only 
whether the activity involved "a risk of serious harm" to others that 
"could not be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care," and 
whether the activity was or was not "a matter of common usage."82 
It may be objected that the Restatement (Second) merely made 
explicit the factors already considered by the courts. This is not so. 
Of course, in a close case, whatever the legal issue, factors like the 
comparative wealth of the parties and the social importance of the 
activity are likely to be considered and will likely influence the deci-
sion. One should not ignore the individual equities in any case. But 
to recognize that the courts will be influenced by individual equities 
in deciding some legal issue is not the same as saying that these indi-
vidual equities themselves are the legal issue. 
An enormous range oflegal decisions could all be plausibly justi-
fied under section 520 of the Restatement (Second). For example, it 
was held in Maryland that a neighborhood gas station, whose leak-
ing storage tanks fouled the well of an adjoining landowner, was an 
abnormally dangerous activity. 83 An Oregon court has, however, 
disagreed. 84 In a Florida court it was seriously urged, again on the 
basis of the new version of section 520, that a mine producing 
phosphatic wastes was not an abnormally dangerous activity because 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 520, Co=ent I. 
82. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938). 
83. Yo=er v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220,257 A.2d 138 (1969). The court specifically held 
that section 520 of the Restatement (Second) considered in draft form had the effect of enlarg-
ing the circumstances under which the rule of strict liability will apply. 255 Md. at 223-24, 257 
A.2d at 140. 
84. Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 279 Or. 3, 566 P.2d 175 (1977). The court held that the 
operation of a gas station was not so exceptional a circumstance nor was the danger from 
seepage so grave as to warrant classifying the activity as "abnormally dangerous." 279 Or. at 
8, 566 P.2d at 178. 
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of the location of the mine and its social importance. 85 The court, 
however, ruled against the defendant because of the size of the activ-
ity and the possibility of enormous damage if the activity miscar-
ried. 86 
I leave to others the question of whether section 520 of the Re-
statement (Second) is an improvement. My own opinion is that it is 
not. I wish to use the example, however, because it (a) involves torts; 
(b) is clearly an attempt to bring the factor analysis involved in inter-
est balancing into the decisional process in an area where it had hith-
erto not played so prominent a part; and (c) clearly highlights the 
difficulties behind interest balancing as a viable decision-making 
tool. I fault White not because he does not discuss this single exam-
ple. But White claims that his book is a critical history of American 
tort law and that the realist impulse toward interest balancing was an 
intellectual development of major importance in that history. Yet he 
scarcely discusses the intellectual problems that that development 
presents. For this I fault him. 
85. Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 801-03 (Fla. App. 197S). 
86. 312 So. 2d at 803-04. 
